

Party Organizer



"The things we have to do to commemorate the 15th Anniversary of our Party form an organic part of the preparations for the Seventh World Congress, making the Party conscious of its own history, which is also making them conscious of the history of the Communist International. This is the task of the 15th Anniversary. We have to assimilate in our Party the traditions of the Communist International and the history of our Party and this is a big political task which must be planned on a national scale and then sub-planned down in each district and in every unit. This is a process of making the Party conscious of the world movement, making it conscious of our own Party as a historical movement, and giving the Party the sense of history and partaking in history". — Earl Browder, "Report on Seventh World Congress of Comintern".

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The Organization of the Fifteenth Anniversary of the Communist Party

By MARTIN YOUNG

ALL LEADING committees of our Party are already informed of the plans of the Central Committee concerning the celebrations of the Fifteenth Anniversary of our Party. The preparations for the Party Anniversary are part of the preparations for the Seventh Congress of the Communist International. The main problem now is the correct and efficient execution of these plans by the Districts, Sections and all lower units of the Party.

As already stated by the Central Committee, the Fifteenth Anniversary campaign has a two-fold purpose: (1) to raise the political level of the Party membership, which concretely means in this case "making the Party conscious of its own history, which is also making them conscious of the history of the Communist International" (Browder); (2) in the course of this campaign to raise funds in order to secure the existence of the **Daily Worker**.

There are two ways to approach this campaign. If this campaign is approached formally, merely as another campaign, without recognizing its political value, the two objectives set forth by the Central Committee will not be accomplished. With such an approach the results, at best, will be scattered small mass meetings, lifeless discussion in some of the units and the conduct of the campaign relegated to some committee without the entire Party participating in it. However, if any District will be permitted to relegate this campaign to the background it would be depriving the Party of an opportunity to increase its fighting capacity.

It can, however, be stated that the entire Party is taking this campaign very seriously. At the last Central Committee meeting Comrade Browder stated: "The fighting capacity of our Party will be determined to a great extent by how much we can raise the political level in this period of the Seventh World Congress." This means that the fighting capacity of every District and Section of the Party will be evaluated in the light of its preparations for the Fifteenth Anniversary of the Party and the Seventh Congress of the Communist International.

Planning the Campaign

The first task in this campaign for every Party organization is to work out its plans of the development of the campaign. The period of the Anniversary celebrations is not for a day but for nearly an entire month. This means that the campaign must be continuously moving on and developing new phases during this entire period. This requires serious planning.

The success of these plans and the campaign in general depends on the ability of the District leadership to involve the Party functionaries in the direction and execution of its plans. This means that every functionary of the Party, every Section and unit organizer, every agitator and propagandist and every fraction secretary must know what is expected of him or her in this campaign. It is also necessary to establish the necessary check-up and control of the execution of these plans so as to be able to assist in time those sections of the Party which lag behind.

The Center of the Campaign

In addition to our general mass agitation in the Anniversary celebrations such as mass meetings, distribution and sale of literature, etc., it is necessary to make the center of this campaign in the units, factories and mass organizations. In the units the task is actually twofold.

In the first place, especially when taking into consideration that the bulk of the Party membership is new, it is essential to acquaint the Party membership with a knowledge and understanding of the history of our Party and the Communist International. We must equip this membership with some knowledge of the role of the Party in the class struggle of the American proletariat. It would be wrong, however, to expect that with one or two discussions at unit meetings we will be able to familiarize our membership with 15 years of history and struggle of our Party and the Communist International. This is of course impossible nor should it even be attempted. We should select major lessons from our Party history with which the membership should be acquainted. For instance, why the Communist Party was organized in America; the role of the Communist International in the development of our Party; the struggle of our Party on two fronts, against counter-revolutionary Trotzkyism and Lovestoneism; the trade union policy of our Party; our anti-war policies and struggles; the national program of the Party and the struggle for Negro rights; work among the youth; the struggle for Soviet Power and other phases of our Party and Comintern program in their historical development.

Secondly, through the units and shop nuclei we must mobilize the Party membership for the carrying through of this campaign in the factories, especially in the concentration places and in the mass organizations. We mean here the popularization of the Party program among the working masses in the shops, to show them the difference between our Party and other political parties, especially the Socialist Party, the Farmer-Labor Party, the difference between a political Party and a union and to make the most class conscious workers join the Party, spread our Party literature and secure donations and subscriptions for our Party press. This, of course, can best be carried out through personal discussion with groups of workers arranged in private houses, during lunch-hour discussions, visits of workers' homes and bringing workers to our mass meetings and lectures.

The development of the campaign in the mass organizations with the aim of popularizing the program of our Party, recruiting of new members and raising of funds for the **Daily Worker** will be successfully accomplished only when the Party fractions are prepared and mobilized for this task. A formal approach to this question, that is, mechanically imposing a Party speaker or representative or some casual unorganized sale of literature and collection of funds, will not bring the desired results. The Party fractions must organize and prepare the appearance of the Party representative as well as the sale of literature, stimulate the discussion of the Party program and immediately arrange for the following up of the campaign in the organization, especially amongst those workers who have demonstrated the greatest of interest.

In the Fifteenth Anniversary celebrations and the preparations for the Seventh Congress the sale and distribution of literature have a very important role to play. We must convince our Party membership that nothing can replace minimum reading of essential literature and documents relating to the history of our Party and the Communist International. The special literature prepared for the Party Anniversary must receive especially wide circulation. At the same time, the leading committees of the Party must encourage reading of fundamental and programatic literature. The best way to stimulate the reading of such literature is through organized group reading and discussion. We must attempt to organize in each unit and shop nucleus special study groups on a specific question in which the comrades are most interested.

The Fifteenth Anniversary celebrations will take place in the midst of the most active stage of the election campaign. It stands to reason that the Fifteenth Anniversary

campaign can best succeed when fitted in the election struggles. The raising of the political level of the Party membership through the Anniversary celebrations must have its effect in the immediate struggles of the Party. This can actually be so if the campaign is properly developed. If the Party membership becomes more politically conscious of the historical development of our own Party and the struggles associated with it, and the world revolutionary movement, the fighting capacity of our Party will be increased. The membership will learn from the Party history how to work better amongst the masses, how more successfully to combat social-fascism and how to win the majority of the working class for our program. The Fifteenth Anniversary celebrations can and must serve this purpose.

The Communist Fractions and Their Relations to the Party Committees

(Extract from *The Bolshevization of the Communist Parties*)

By O. PIATNITSKY

IT WAS easier for the Bolsheviks in Czarist Russia than for the Communist Parties of the capitalist countries to establish the mutual relations between the Communist fractions and Party committees since the Party organizations actually conducted a great variety of activities. They led the economic struggle, organized trade unions and cooperative societies and created all sorts of labor organizations, such as were allowed to exist under the Czarist regime, from 1905 until the war. That is why the Party organizations were recognized authorities in the eyes of the workers in all these organizations, especially of the Party members and sympathizers. This situation appeared to all to be quite natural and no one raised any question about it. When we came into power there were some tendencies among certain Soviet Communist fractions to supplant the Party organs, but this was a passing phenomenon. The relations between the Party organizations and the Communist fractions (or individual Communists) in the non-Party mass labor organizations prior to, and, especially, since the capture of power, have been such that the Party organizations decide the important questions while the Communist fractions and the individual Communists, no matter what non-Party organizations may be affected, carry the decisions into effect. The Communist fractions themselves decide upon the methods for carrying out the decisions. In their everyday work they

are entirely independent. They can and must display initiative in their work within the non-Party organizations and bodies. The Communist fractions in the leading bodies of the non-Party organizations must not only report to the conferences and congresses which elected them, but also to the Party committees. Prior to the October Revolution, and even immediately after it, when there were still Mensheviks and Social-Revolutionaries in some of the non-Party mass organizations, the Bolsheviks converted each newly-gained position into a stronghold for the capture of the organization in the district, city, region and nationally. They demonstrated their ability to work better than the others, prepare the questions, lead, and weld together and organize the masses of the workers. That is why they succeeded in driving the Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries and the other "Socialist" and populist parties out of the mass labor organizations.

In the Communist Parties in capitalist countries things are different because in them social-democratic traditions are still preserved, which are frequently interwoven with sectarianism. The trade unions, and the other proletarian mass organizations, arose before the Social-Democratic Parties in the principal capitalist countries and made a strong position for themselves in the working class as independent organizations which led the economic struggle.

The members of the Social-Democratic Parties who led the mass proletarian organizations, therefore, had a definite amount of independence. Moreover, the Social-Democratic Party not only did not oppose this independence but on the contrary, they themselves developed the theory that the trade unions were equal in value to, and therefore should have equal rights with, the party, that the trade unions were neutral organizations. The only exception in this respect was the Bolshevik Party. A number of cases could be quoted in the history of German social-democracy for instance, when the decisions of the trade union congresses differed from those of the Social-Democratic Party Congresses—for instance, on the question of the general strike in 1905. And this was so despite the fact that the delegates to the trade union congresses were social-democrats who knew the standpoint of the party. The same thing occurred in connection with the celebration of the First of May. Before the war the Social-Democratic Parties in Central Europe celebrated May Day on the first of May, while the social-democratic "free" trade unions sabotaged the First of May celebration, in order to avoid paying victimization benefit to workers who might lose their jobs for taking part in May Day celebrations on the First of May. The trade unions urged that May Day should be celebrated on the first Sunday in May

These relations, which existed between the Social-Democratic Parties and the trade unions before the war, and which the Bolsheviks regarded as abnormal (since the war surprising unanimity has been displayed between the Social-Democratic Parties and trade unions and there has been complete cooperation between them in betraying the interests of the working class in their respective countries) cannot be tolerated in a Bolshevik Party since they prevent uniform leadership being exercised over all forms of the revolutionary labor movement. But they have been inherited from the Social-Democratic Parties by the Communist Parties in the capitalist countries.

The abnormal relations between the Communist Parties and the Communist fractions in the trade unions and in all the other mass proletarian organizations are due to two fundamental causes: the Party committees sometimes supplant the mass organizations, they remove the elected secretaries and appoint others, they openly publish in the press such things as: We propose to the Red trade unions that they do this or that; that is, they act in a way as is very rarely done even by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Usually the decisions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union or of the local Party committees are carried out through the Communist fractions or through individual Party members working in this or that non-Party organization. Another cause of the abnormal relations is that the individual members of the Communist Party work on their own accord, disregard the directions of the Party organs or disobey them. There have been cases in France, for instance, when the Party organs thought that they must do absolutely everything, that they must take the place of the International Red Aid, the trade unions, the co-operative and sport organizations, that they alone can perform the functions of these organizations. This is absolutely wrong. Even had the leadership of many of the Communist Parties been a hundred times superior to what it is, in reality, they could not do the work of these organizations. This, in fact, is unnecessary, because both the Central Committee and the local Party organizations should only determine the line, see that the line is carried out, lead the Communist fractions and the individual Communists working in the mass organizations. The Central Committee and the Party committees must get their directives carried out in the mass labor organizations through the Communist fractions or the individual Party members where there are no fractions, but they must not do their work for them.

However, I think it is hardly necessary to go into further details to prove that these incorrect relations between the

Party, the trade unions and the mass organizations generally interfere with the extension of the Party connections among the masses, with the real consolidation of the Party among the masses.

In the countries in which there are Red trade unions there exist side by side with them, in the same industries, trade unions of other tendencies. However, the Red trade unions have very rarely succeeded in capturing whole organizations, or more or less considerable groups of members, from the trade unions of other tendencies.

The trade union oppositions in the reformist trade unions frequently succeed in gaining a majority in the local branches of the different reformist trade unions. But the Communist Parties and the trade union oppositions do not convert these into strongholds from which to extend their influence over the other branches of the same union or over branches of other trade unions which are affiliated to the same local trades council. This can only be explained by the fact that the opposition branches not infrequently take up the same position as reformist trade unions. The same applies to the Red factory committees. They do not receive proper leadership and the necessary aid in their work.

How the Party Units in the Chicago Stockyards Worked in the Strike.

By A UNIT ORGANIZER

THE SECOND strike of the 800 livestock handlers, organized in the A. F. of L. has ended with only small concessions for the strikers. The reason the strike was not won was primarily due to the fact that the strike was conducted in a typical A. F. of L. manner. No mass picketing (although a group of workers were around the gates daily) and the strike was not spread to the rest of the workers.

There was strong sentiment for spreading the strike, especially among the butchers, who are fairly well organized in the A. F. of L., especially in the smaller plants.

The Party units in the Chicago stockyards, as well as the fraction in the Packinghouse Workers Industrial Union, from the very first day of the strike raised the slogan of mass picketing and spreading the strike. Not only did we raise the slogan, but we proceeded toward realization of it in the following manner: We decided to organize actions in the departments. In one department 200 workers stopped work demanding an increase in wages. They resumed work only when a large detachment of police was brought to the de-

partment and terrorized the workers. On another occasion the workers stopped the boss from extending the working day by a half-hour when a mass delegation of workers placed before the superintendent the demand that they do not work the extra half-hour. This demand was immediately granted.

The pressure from below for a strike among the butchers was quite strong and a leaflet was even issued by the butchers' local of the A. F. of L. calling upon the rest of the butchers to strike. The reason the strike did not materialize was due to the fact that the top leadership of the butchers' union, and especially the international leadership, was against it, and above all, that neither in the Livestock Handlers Union nor in the Butchers Union did we have an organized opposition. As a matter of fact, we had no contacts inside of the Livestock Handlers Union. That is why, despite the leaflets, mass meetings and even department actions, we were unable to influence sufficiently the course of the development of the strike, although even our little activity scared the bosses and officialdom of the A. F. of L. and they really feared that the strike might be spread.

The Party units in the yards learned as a result of this strike one basic lesson, that it is not sufficient to have a Party unit organized, as we have several units now, with 63 Party and Y.C.L. members in the yards. It is not enough to have the Packinghouse Workers Industrial Union, which is weak; but it is necessary to have an organized opposition movement with a concrete program of action and demands inside of the existing locals of the A. F. of L.

Although the majority of the stockyard workers remain unorganized, the largest single number of workers organized in the stockyards are members of the A. F. of L.; butchers, livestock handlers, electricians, maintenance men and truck drivers are completely or partially organized in the unions of the A. F. of L. That is why it is absolutely necessary, in light of the Open Letter, the decisions of the Eighth Convention, and of the District Buro, that the comrades become members of the A. F. of L. and develop work *inside* of the locals of the A. F. of L., working toward unification of the struggles and developing department struggles.

The problem of the united front of the workers is an important question. However, it can be realized not only by building the Packinghouse Workers Industrial Union, but by developing, above all, a powerful opposition movement inside the A. F. of L.

The building of the Party and Y.C.L. in the yards to 63 members shows that the workers are looking towards our Party for leadership, and that better organization of our

work, with clear political perspective, working inside of the A. F. of L., becoming members of the unions of the A. F. of L., will strengthen the work and will prevent further betrayals and sell-outs of strikes. Among other things, we must in a most patient manner explain to the stockyard workers that by joining the Party they must not drop out of the A. F. of L. On the contrary, the leaflet drawn up by the District Committee of the Communist Party calls upon the members of the A. F. of L. to become members of the Communist Party in order to become better fighters in the unions of the A. F. of L., that under the guidance and leadership of the Party they will be able to defeat the leadership of Gorman, Dennis Lane and faker Martin Murphy of the Stockyards Labor Council.

The units of the Party and Y.C.L. discussed the problems confronting us and in light of this organized their work better.

Actual Experiences in Building the Party in International Harvester Co.

By A MCCORMICK WORKER

BEFORE THE Open Letter was issued to the membership, we had only four members in the International Harvester McCormick and Tractor Plants. Now we can say that we have a much better situation. For obvious reasons, we cannot go into actual figures on the number of units and members—but we can say that now we have an organization in the plants which is giving daily leadership to the workers in their struggles against rotten living conditions and against the bosses' attacks. We are continuing to make more progress. Here is how the work is done.

The work of building the Party was actually initiated by two active comrades—one comrade in the McCormick plant and the other in the Tractor plant. We had a small group meeting where we decided upon ways and means of building the Party. At the second meeting, one comrade brought in two new members and other comrades brought in a new member every week or two. Each month at least one new member is brought in by the comrades. In this way we increased our membership in a very short time.

How did we approach the workers? After our unit meetings are over (our meetings are short and to the point), we go to visit workers in our departments at their homes. Comrades go visiting in groups of two. This brought about wonderful results, bringing in other new members.

When we came into the workers' homes, we talked very simply about the happenings in their departments, actual working conditions, worsening of the speed-up system, etc. We always showed how these bad working conditions could be changed if we were organized and stuck together. We show to them why the Communist Party is the only working class political party that honestly fights for the workers' interests. **Then we ask them to join this workers' Party.** In this way in a short while we had new units organized in International Harvester.

What do we take up at our unit meetings? At each meeting, we take up the question of new members. We ask each comrade present to give us names of workers in his department whom he thinks we can bring into the Party. Then we visit these workers. Then the following week, just a few hours before the next unit meeting starts, we make another round of these prospective members' homes, reminding them of our unit meeting and that we expect them to attend. If possible, we even take them right along with us directly to the meeting.

At each unit meeting, we take steps to keep these new members in the Party. We hold educational discussions of the Party program, tasks of the unit in the shop, etc. Each week we assign a different comrade to study up and prepare a report on various subjects: one week a comrade reported on Manuilsky's report to the 17th Congress of the C.P.S.U., another week a report on the Party Convention, then on the Negro question, etc. In this way, we develop the political understanding of the members and draw them closer to the movement.

At the unit we of course discuss concrete conditions in the shop—just exactly what is happening in this and that department. Each comrade makes a short report on the latest development of the last week in his department. Then we discuss how we can develop struggles in the departments around these developments.

The results of this work are plain to everyone. Already we can see the presence of the Party being felt by the workers in many ways. More than that, the foremen and the company feel the presence of the Party. For example, the foremen no longer bully the workers nor swear at them as they used to before we became active. The foremen seem to have shrunk from big arrogant cats into quiet humble mice. How did we do this? We organized a simultaneous agitation in all departments against the foremen's slave-driving bullying tactics. We exposed these foremen personally by name in the Party shop papers (**McCormick Worker** and **Tractor Worker**), calling them down on the carpet for

their dirty work. When the papers come out with these exposures, some workers secretly place copies of the paper right on the foremen's desks, so that the foremen cannot see their exposures. The foremen go up in steam when they read these exposures, and although they are raging with anger, they are afraid to attack anybody. Immediately, the workers notice that the foremen go easier on them.

The presence of the Party was felt in other ways. At a so-called "safety" meeting of the company, held each week, the foremen announced to the workers that if they forget or lose their pass-checks, they must pay 25 cents and lose a day's wages. This fine really amounts to about five dollars. We at once put up this question in the unit meeting and started a broad campaign in all departments both through personal agitation and through the shop papers, demanding that the company do away with these scandalous regulations. How effective our Party campaign was can be seen by the fact that at the very next "safety" meeting held the following week these regulations were withdrawn and the workers told that they could get new pass-checks **without** losing their day's wages.

No grievance of the workers, no matter how petty it may seem to us, is too small for our Party to give the closest attention to it. Here is another example of how our McCormick comrades mobilized the workers around a concrete issue. The workers "love" the McCormick plant so much that at quitting time, they hurry to the street cars at a fast walking and even running tempo. The company placed its bull-dogs at every gate to slow down the workers, take their pass-checks, and the next morning they were instructed to report at the employment office. There, about 150 workers were given a long lecture from 7:30 to 10 o'clock on their own time without pay. They were told, if it happened again they would be fined and if it happened a third time, they may be fired. The workers were aroused against this arbitrary rule. So the Party again took this question up in the shop papers, ridiculing this rule and making a joke of it. Result: the company was compelled to stop even trying to carry out this nonsensical ruling. The workers can see that it was the Party which was responsible for this good work.

The units consider their shop papers as one of our most effective and valuable weapons of struggle and organization. Before the Open Letter, the shop papers at International Harvester were badly edited, the articles dull and uninteresting, mostly written in the District office by comrades who did not work in the shops and therefore, did not feel

the workers' irritations and special problems. The articles were long, politically abstract and not connected with workers' own experiences. Never did the papers come out regularly. However, now, since the Open Letter, having taken up in detail our weaknesses and wrong methods in editing and issuing shop papers, we have changed the situation to satisfy the workers' feelings and needs inside the shop. How did we do this? Before the Open Letter, not even the Party members wrote articles. But now, not only do they write articles, but they get other non-Party workers to write department articles. Then they correct and edit these workers' articles and get them ready for printing. Unlike our previous issues, our shop papers became full of short snappy department items, shop news on simple concrete issues, connecting these issues concretely with the political program of the Party. We emphasized how these grievances can be met and remedied by organization and struggle under the leadership of the Communist Party. It is a very good idea, we found, to put the number of the department at the head of each article on department conditions. The workers want to read and learn what is being said about their own department. Variety of articles from as many different departments as possible is advisable. We have never missed an issue each month since the Open Letter. Workers are so enthused about the shop papers that they ask why they are not issued each week, and some say, each day. (Here is a great field for the sale of pamphlets, for the workers are hungry for our literature.) We take care of the actual distribution by getting concentration street units to assign comrades to distribute each issue of the shop papers.

The results of this work are as follows:

1. A considerable number of new members joined the Party through shop papers.
 2. Prestige of the Party before the workers in the shop has been increased—workers look forward to the Party with respect.
 3. Since the Party went into action, the wages of the workers went up 21 per cent.
 4. Quite a few workers joined the Steel and Metal Workers Industrial Union. We will deal more fully with this question in the following article.
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Party Problems In Birmingham

By SYD BENSON

THE KEYNOTE of the present period in the life of our Party in Birmingham is the organizational consolidation of our membership and influence. This process of consolidation must be carried on in the face of a wild wave of terror directed against the Party, seeking to drive us underground, and away from the masses. This process of consolidation must be carried through in the greatest spirit of concentration. Our forces must be placed in the main points, and must work among the basic masses in the shops and trade unions. Under all circumstances, we must build an apparatus able to reach the masses, able to function under any circumstances, able to recruit from the proletarian masses in the heaviest industries. We must organize a method of work which will develop new forces rapidly, educate our membership, increase our active membership, our dues payments, our **Daily Worker** and **Southern Worker** circulation, and the means to distribute literature and leaflets on a mass scale.

In the past period a series of strikes took place in the Birmingham area, strikes which included thousands of coal and ore miners from our points of concentration. These strikes were sold out by the corrupt leadership of the A. F. of L. without any serious opposition from the rank and file. Yet, we had great influence among the strikers to begin with, and, through our correct slogans and demands, this influence grew during the struggles. The basic shortcoming was in that we did not lay the greatest of emphasis on the units in the key mines, and develop our campaign as much as possible through our Party members in the mines, however new and inexperienced they were. Our agitation was confined to leaflets from the outside, while for the most part, our units in the mines stopped meeting, or carried on very little work, mostly disconnected from the Party as a whole and on an individual scale. At the very time when we should have practiced concentration in the real sense of the word, hit upon the key mines, where we had units and Party members, and developed a powerful campaign in the unions through these units, we stood by and allowed these units to fall apart while we rushed around with all sorts of agitation from the outside. Here we had a chance to train the units to function during struggle, to meet every day, or every other day, to pick out a few good comrades and develop them as the Unit Buro, meeting daily, and even twice daily when necessary. We could have turned these

comrades to real work in the A. F. of L. unions, which met almost daily, and taught them to raise problems, to build rank-and-file groups able to act as the articulate organ among the striking masses, bringing in the line of the District Buro, defending the interests of the men against the bureaucrats.

This demanded that we assign real forces to work among the strikers, forces able to develop the activity and initiative of our Party units and members, raw and new though they were. Instead, we found that some of our comrades, leading comrades, adopted a conciliatory attitude toward the non-meeting of the units, placing the question of picket duty as against unit meetings, bringing up the question of terror. These comrades thus failed to realize any organizational results from the strike, and failed to develop our comrades, and tended to substitute their individual agitation for the planned work of our Party members who were actually strikers and union members. This was the case in the Z—— Coal Mine of the T.C.I., the biggest coal mine in Alabama, where we had a unit when the strike started, and which we are still trying to rebuild. The example of this point of concentration must constantly be held up to our comrades as a sad lesson in how not to concentrate, in how not to work during a strike.

The wave of terror unleashed on May Day, the daily raids and arrests, the beatings and heavy sentences, the arrest of the entire leadership in May, all served to partly demoralize and confuse our local comrades, and for a time to hold back mass work. During this period, recruiting dropped to practically nothing, dues payments to little more, and our work among the striking ore miners, where we had a very good position at the outset of the strike, fell to almost nothing as far as exerting any planned campaign among the strikers in the union locals. This campaign of repression is still continuing, but the work of the Party is growing rapidly anyway. The dues payments have reached just short of the average before the terror and are climbing, and the recruiting is also up to the peak of last April. At the same time, we are learning to work in such a manner that the terror of the police only drives us deeper among the masses, working more closely in the organizations of the workers, primarily the trade unions. The past mistakes, the poor work during the strikes, and the terror, must teach us to develop a firmly functioning apparatus, connecting the units and Sections firmly, and above all concentrating on the key points, the points designated by the Central Committee Letter of July 16.

The Letter of the Central Committee discussed very

sharply our shortcomings in regard to concentration, especially the tendency to spread our concentration over too many points, thus losing the whole essence of what concentration means. The center also very sharply and correctly criticized our weaknesses in trade union work, in the building of an underground apparatus, our failure to organize the mass work of the Party, the mass distribution of leaflets, the building of fractions to guide the mass organizations, at the same time aiming our heaviest guns on our concentration points.

The Letter of the Central Committee had a very strong effect upon the leadership of the Party in Birmingham, and caused a very healthy reaction among the membership in the units and Sections. The rank and file comrades saw and appreciated the policy of the Letter towards concentration on the key places, placing before us concrete tasks and laying down concrete directives to realize these tasks. The Letter names as our concentration points just 3 places, the most important coal mine, the largest iron ore mine, and the main steel mill. And placing the main trade union tasks as building mass rank and file groups in the respective locals, in the U.M.W.A. local at the Z—— Mine, in the A.A. in the Sheet Mill, and in the local of the I. U. of M. M. S. W. at X——. All of these places are part of the T.C.I., the U.S. Steel subsidiary, which dominates the industrial life of the entire Birmingham area.

Since we received the C.C. Letter we have taken up' in the District Buro the situation in each of these places week by week, inviting comrades from there to report, and assigning a District Buro rep to each place. An example as favorable as the Z—— Mine is bad is the work in the X—— Ore Mine. Here we had quite a large number of scattered Party members before the strike. After the strike we assigned a responsible comrade to daily work in rebuilding the nucleus. On the basis of individual attention, and serious work, we can now register a functioning membership of 30 comrades, with a functioning group system, and a rapidly advancing Unit Buro, meeting regularly, and directing the work of the groups. The unit is acting as a fraction in the union local, taking up the issues confronting the men, relief, the attacks of the gun thugs, etc., and the result is that we have two comrades in the Executive Board, and are winning the support of the membership for our policies. The experiences of the comrades in this nucleus must be transferred to the Sheet Mill, and to the Z—— Mine units, as well as to the Party as a whole, so that we will most rapidly carry out the directives of the Central Committee Letter, consolidate our position, develop the work

of our nuclei, especially in our points of concentration, strengthen ourselves in the trade unions, and "move forward from the leadership of the day to day struggles to the actual leadership of the big strikes and class battles that lie ahead."

Are We Using the Tools at Hand to Help Build a Mass Party?

By ROBERT FRANKLIN

IN ANALYZING the work of the N. Y. District in its literature distribution for the last six months, we notice a progressive monthly increase. If we would just stop at the totals, 789,000 pieces and approximately \$50,000, we would not get the true picture of the role that the Party membership itself plays in this distribution.

First, we find that in the number of pieces distributed, the Party only distributed 26% of the total, and analyzing the money received, only 16% of the money came through the Party channels.

We all agree that the main task of our Party is organizing workers into our ranks. We all agree that one of the best ways to organize these workers is by having them read our literature. Understanding this, is it not criminal to find that on the average, only one Section has shown a distribution of 3 pieces of literature per week, per member; in 3 Sections, 2½ pieces per member, in 1 Section, 2 pieces per member; in 3 Sections, 1½ pieces per member; in 1 Section, 1 piece per member and in 4 Sections, less than 1 piece per member, per week? We can now see one of the reasons why our Party is not growing as fast as it should in this period of extreme radicalization of the masses of workers.

In considering the above distribution per member, we must understand that in it are included **The Communist, Communist International, Inprecor, Party Organizer**, and a mass of other pamphlets which in the main have not been gotten up for outside distribution, and taking this into consideration, the number of pieces of literature distributed to outside workers grows much smaller.

Of course, many of our comrades in the Sections and in the Districts will say that our Party comrades cannot wait till new literature reaches the Sections and then the unit, but that they will immediately go to the bookshop and buy new literature there. This may be true but this argument further strengthens our contention that the Party members

on the whole are criminally lax in the distribution of our literature to the outside workers.

In the campaign to save Comrade Thaelmann's life from the German butchers, consider the fact that in the New York District only 15,000 pieces of the "Save Thaelmann" pamphlets were distributed. This gives an idea of the extent that our literature is tied up with our general campaigns. In this Thaelmann campaign the Party has gone much further than in any of our popular campaigns in reaching the workers. It is true that we have made quite a good deal of progress in literature distribution through our mass organizations and on this point many of our comrades will say that it is our Party members who are doing the distribution there. But this is not exactly true, because most of these mass organizations get their literature directly from the District literature department and do their own distributing to their own members. The time is past when a member of a unit can say that he gets his literature through the unit and distributes it through the mass organizations. This serious shortcoming of literature distribution in the Party is the result of:

1. The turn-over of Section literature agents in the Sections is very great. At the present only 2 or 3 Section literature agents have been in this most important division of Party work more than 3 months. The Section still feels that the appointment of a comrade to take charge of literature distribution in the Section is a minor task, and one to be filled only because of the pressure put on the Section by the District. Any comrade who cannot be used for other important work in the Section is placed in this responsible position. We can safely say at the present moment that the personnel of the Section literature agents is far below the ability and the development that the position of this nerve center of the Party requires.

2. The complete lack of coordination and cooperation of the work of the Agitprop from the District down to the Section and into the units is another very important contributing factor for the poor distribution through our Party channels. There is absolutely no cooperation in the majority of our Sections and between the literature department and the Agit-props. The separation of these two departments in the planning of work can be illustrated by Section 17. This Section in planning its work for August First, took everything into consideration except the distribution of literature. When this was pointed out to the Section, the literature agent was told, "All right, you can distribute the literature."

3. Another very important contributing factor in the poor distribution of literature through the Party channels that we

have not yet learned, is how to combine our literature distribution with all our campaigns. Our leading comrades have not yet learned how to tie up this work with their plans. And of course, when these plans reach the units, the individual comrades of the Party take their cue from these plans and they leave out literature, as very few units show individual initiative, all this despite the fact that literature placed in the hands of a worker is one of the direct organizational steps in propelling this worker into our movement.

Another very important point in analyzing our report is the poor showing that we made in distributing our 13th Plenum material and the 17th Congress reports of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. We have had to actually force Sections to take this Plenum material and without exception we have had a good portion of them returned.

This underestimation, or rather offhand viewpoint of the writings on the world situation by our international leaders, is a direct result of the lack of work of the Agit-prop departments in the Districts and in the Sections. When we find such a poor distribution of our 13th Plenum material on War and Fascism, on Germany and Soviet China, etc., this becomes almost like an act of sabotage against our movement, for if only our Party members were to become familiar with the contents of the 13th Plenum material they would do their utmost to see that this material at least reaches the membership of our own mass organizations. This would immediately make for a tremendous distribution and a tremendous rise in the political level of the Party members and our sympathizers. This would act as a real vital organizational force in the movement.

The weakest point of the whole report is the poor showing of our trade unions. When we consider the membership of over 50,000 in the T.U.U.L. unions and the other numbers of thousands in the independent unions, we must stand aghast at this poor showing. We must say in this connection that the understanding of the leadership of these unions of the value of distribution is either all or that the service they render the movement on this important work is only lip service. This lack of distribution of literature in the trade unions is one of the reasons there is such a poor distribution of the **Labor Unity** amongst the ranks of the trade unions in the New York District.

We find that in the average Section only $\frac{1}{3}$ to $\frac{1}{2}$ the Party is in contact with the current literature. We find that the Sections look at this matter quite tolerantly and that in very few cases are the Unit Buros brought in to explain this holding up of the most important work. We invariably find that the average Unit Buro does not ask for a report

or take up the question of the literature distribution in connection with the unit work.

In conclusion, we can say that the work of the Party itself in the literature distribution has not even begun, and only when we as a Party reach that point where each member of every unit distributes not less than 10 pamphlets per week, and when the fact is so clear in the minds of our comrades that without literature the work by the Party cannot go forward, and that without literature no campaign can be successful, and that without literature we cannot organize workers into our ranks and when this fact has become imbedded in the minds of our Party members, that every Party member become a literature distributor and every literature distributor a Party organizer, then only will we begin to see real literature distribution in the New York District.

The following suggestions will illustrate how this is to be accomplished:

1. The organization of a District literature committee composed of a member of a trade union, member of a mass organization, member of the District Agit-prop, member of literature department and one other; this committee to meet regularly not less than once in two weeks.

2. Real cooperation between the District Agit-prop and the District literature department through the Sections and down to the units.

3. A combined meeting of Section Agit-props and Section literature agents at least once in 6 weeks. The regular meeting of Section literature agents with the District literature department every two weeks. A real attempt by the District Buro to finally establish literature distribution in our trade unions. The carrying out of discussions from the Sections into the units on the political and organizational importance of literature distribution.

4. The tying up of all our campaigns with literature distribution. All campaigns to be planned with this important factor included. The immediate obtaining of a column not less than twice a week in the **Daily Worker** on literature. The writing of articles in all our publications by our leading comrades so as to popularize and make the Party members understand and desire to read and study our literature.

5. The slogan of "Every Party member a literature distributor. Every literature distributor a Party organizer." Every member of the Party to distribute at least 5 pamphlets per week.

How the New York Party Helped the Y. C. L.

By CHAS. KRUMBEIN

AT THE RECENT Conventions of the Party, District as well as National, tremendous stress was laid upon the question of work among the youth. This grows out of the situation in which we find ourselves in the country, as well as on a world scale, facing the danger of war and fascism. Since the Conventions there has been underestimation of the work in this field. It can be said that, generally speaking, we again have a situation where resolutions have been adopted, but far from sufficient is being done to apply these resolutions.

The New York District made some attempts, small but nevertheless a beginning. We felt in the New York District that, similar to many other questions, the Party was not conscious of the political significance of youth in the present situation, and, therefore, did not see as a Party task the winning of the youth. Therefore, we undertook what we labeled a drive which had as its main objective the task of making the Party youth-conscious. That is, that in the course of the day to day work in every campaign, in every field of activity, to see to it that we, the Party, along with the League, see and understand the problems of the youth in connection with the particular campaign or activity and project the proper demands for the youth, drawing them into organization and leadership. This drive we undertook some five weeks before National Youth Day, mapping out a plan of immediate tasks to be fulfilled, a drive that would fulfill these immediate tasks until the National Convention of the League, and from this point on, as a result of the drive, to get the Party as a whole to continue concerning itself with work among the youth.

For National Youth Day we worked out a plan, which, among other things called for the issuance of 200,000 leaflets, a manifesto on youth. This leaflet called upon the young workers, as well as the adult workers, to participate in National Youth Day. We got out 250 posters for National Youth Day, 25,000 stickers; and when the Y.C.L. asked the party in this District to take 10,000 of the special National Youth Day issue of the **Young Worker**, we took up the question with the Section Organizers. We increased this number to 30,000 which we actually took and distributed, as well as tried to get the trade unions to distribute an additional 7,000. We also undertook to sell 10,000 of the special pamphlet issued for N.Y.D., **Flanders Field**, and ac-

tually sold 15,000 in the District. We got out a discussion outline on the entire question that we sent to the units, Sections and fractions, and had quite a thorough discussion from the reports at hand.

We helped the Y.C.L. in a tag day for the purpose of raising money for the Y.C.L., actual results of which I have not had a report on.

1,000 Y.C.L. Members To Be Recruited by N. Y. District

Furthermore, we undertook to recruit within this period of 5 or 6 weeks, 1,000 Y.C.L.'ers for the Y.C.L. This was our weakest accomplishment. Partial reports that have come to me for 3 weeks of the 5, show that 110 were actually recruited. Surely this cannot be compared to the task we set ourselves. We did not see this as an unrealizable task because we know that in the past large numbers of youth have been involved in the struggles carried on by the revolutionary movement. We believed that with the 6,000 Party members in the District at that time, it wasn't too much to expect that on the average, one Party member out of six could recruit a Y.C.L.'er into the Y.C.L. from the shop or from the neighborhood organization in which he may be working. Undoubtedly more than this has been recruited, but the figures I have are only 110. The Section Organizers gave us a counter-plan when we got them to accept the quotas of 1,000, which amounted to 1,400 but we fell far short of this number. I think that the preliminary work that we did already reflected itself in our May Day demonstration. Here we had large numbers of young workers participating. We should mention especially the student section of the parade where over 3,000 participated. The youth were very conspicuous in the industrial sections of the parade as well as in fraternal organizations, clubs, etc.

National Youth Day was above the expectations of all of us and is a clear picture of what we can do to win the youth to our side and thereby considerably shatter the base of imperialist war and fascism. We had about 12,000 in the line of march, (a very hot day) and an additional 25,000 in the meeting after the parade. Altogether there were some 37,000. I should have said that in preparation we also organized Section membership meetings of the Party to thoroughly acquaint the members with the importance of the questions, as well as mobilizing them for the actions that we planned. We also, and this was carried through with some success, instructed all of our shop units issuing shop papers to see to it that either a special issue or special material went into the shop papers for the month preceeding National Youth Day on the question of the youth. Those shops where

large numbers of youth are employed had a special issue, or special material went into the shop papers for the month preceding National Youth Day on the question of youth. Those shops where large numbers of youth are employed had a special issue and those in shops with less youth, had some special feature material in the shop papers.

We tried very hard to involve the trade unions in this drive. I think we had some small results in this connection, but surely not in the degree it should merit. The trade unions should be interested in this question, because of the large numbers of young workers engaged in industries, and should work among the youth to win and retain them in the trade unions.

The work generally was strengthened a little bit, but far from what we must achieve in the trade unions in connection with this phase of work.

The Party gave considerable assistance in the radio industry to our Y.C.L. comrades and quite some success has been attained. We have a united front Council that has been established with organizations of about 1,000 members. 90% in the industry are young workers. At the conference, our comrade in the leadership was elected chairman of the Council by an overwhelming majority of votes. Many valuable lessons for the Party as a whole can be learned from the activities among the radio workers, showing how to work and the possibilities for work.

The relationship of the Party and Y.C.L. respective committees, as well as the units, has considerably improved precisely because of the attention the Party has given to putting into life the youth resolution adopted at the Convention. We more than fulfilled our Convention control tasks insofar as youth work is concerned.

Party's Help Encourages Youth

There are shortcomings and weaknesses in the Y.C.L., but to the degree to which the Party shows some attempts to carry out its tasks it becomes a tremendous factor to get the young comrades to give serious attention to their weaknesses and with the Party's advice to make real efforts to correct the serious weaknesses in the Y.C.L. We saw this at the Y.C.L. District Convention where the Party had six delegates. The District Organizer, Org Sec'y, a leading T.U.U.L. comrade and leading Section Organizers.

We could see the enthusiasm of the Convention which, undoubtedly, reflects the attitude of the membership of the Y.C.L. to the Party. There is a completely changed situation as compared with a few months ago. This was seen also at the National Convention of the Y.C.L. As is to be ex-

pected, the District's attention to this work caused some improvement in the Sections and units of the Party. Section 1 had a big follow-up action after National Youth Day, distributing several thousand leaflets, got quite a turnout and some good results. This Section shows the best recruiting of Y.C.L. members.

I have not mentioned in detail our entire plan, which included the establishing of Y.C.L. shop nuclei, not putting forth a general slogan, but picking out certain shops where the situation is favorable and there try to establish the Y.C.L. Full reports are not in yet. Section 4 is responsible for organizing a Y.C.L. unit. Section 6 organized a Y.C.L. unit in Ridgewood, a territory where the youth is affected by Nazi propoganda. Section 7 organized a Y.C.L. street unit of about 10 members. Section 9, in Jamaica, recruited about 10 members, etc. I am pointing out only a few of the actual accomplishments.

The Y.C.L. in this District has grown substantially in the recent period, from about 500 to 1,600 in the last year with 31 shop units. This doesn't mean much when we consider the possibilities.

Another task is to retain the Y.C.L. members recruited.

Party Shares Responsibility for Shortcomings in Y.C.L.

Partly because of the bad situation within the Y.C.L. we have a situation where we have more members of Y.C.L. age within the Party than within the Y.C.L. itself. I think one of the reasons was, and is, because of the bad inner life of the Y.C.L. Serious young workers did not take the Y.C.L. seriously. This is not only the fault of the Y.C.L., but the Party must take its share of the responsibility. We must recognize this and attempt to overcome it. We must help in improving the whole life and work of the Y.C.L. and retain what the Y.C.L. has gained, and keep the 1,000 members whom we expect to recruit within the next few months. In this connection we are making efforts to put some of the young Party members into the Y.C.L. work, making them feel that the best service they can give to the movement is to work within the Y.C.L., winning wide sections of youth.

The important lessons to be drawn are that the youth are receptive to our message. The question of serious attention to the youth is one of the important problems and tasks of the Party. In New York we have to increase our activities and I think that every District of the Party will have to give much more serious consideration to this question and really give attention to it and start some work.

Strengthen the Fighting Ability of the Party

By J. PETER

THE RESOLUTION of the Eighth National Convention of our Party characterized the New Deal as "the aggressive effort of the bankers and trusts to find their way out of the crisis at the expense of the millions of toilers . . . The New Deal is a program of fascism and the most intense preparations for imperialist war . . ." The recent struggles in Toledo, Minneapolis and especially in San Francisco, Seattle, and Portland proved the absolute correctness of this characterization of the Eighth Convention of our Party. These struggles furnish us with rich experiences as to the trend and content of fascism and as to the problem of the functioning of the Party under difficult conditions. Comrade Browder in his article in the *Daily Worker* (August 4) on the San Francisco situation drew a picture showing how the extra-legal fascist forces financed by the bankers and supported by the Local, State, and Federal government tried to terrorize the workers and how the Party continued to function in spite of the most vicious fascist terror.

In San Francisco, out of 47 Party units, 46 met regularly in this period. Many of them every day. Twenty-two units issued leaflets independently during the strike and the concentrated effort of the fascist bands and police could not get more than an insignificant number of leading comrades.

The question we would like to deal with in this article is: why is it that the Party in San Francisco succeeded to a great extent in destroying the plans of the bourgeoisie, in preserving the fighting capacity of the Party, and in maintaining contact with the masses.

What was the main object of the bourgeoisie?—To isolate the Party from the masses, to cut off all transmissions which connect the Party with the toiling masses, to destroy physically the Communist Party because the bourgeoisie recognized the important role the Communist Party played in developing the mass united front of the toilers on the west coast.

What method did they use in San Francisco and Seattle?

1. Organized mass agitation using the press, movies, churches, etc., to spread their rotten poison against the Communist Party among the population.

2. The utilization of extra-legal fascist forces (vigilantes, American Legion, etc., and the uniformed gangsters, the police) to:

- a. destroy the leadership of the Party,

- b. to destroy the headquarters of the Communist Party and the revolutionary mass organizations, and the literature and press of the revolutionary movement.

The San Francisco example proves to everyone, who had any doubt, that the American fascism in action is the same as Thyssen's brown army—as Mussolini's black guard, etc.

The San Francisco terror is a serious warning to our Party that no time can be wasted to plunge into the work with more energy and tempo,—root the Party in the factories, building the united front in the shops, docks, mines,—among the unemployed on the streets,—organize the fractions in the A. F. of L., independent unions, and other mass organizations. The mass united front will defeat the terror and the bourgeoisie will never succeed to isolate us from the masses if we have strong, functioning shop nuclei, and fractions in the A. F. of L. and other mass organizations.

In this article we will deal with the problem of forces. The bourgeoisie knows very well that by destroying the leading forces inside the Party, the effective work of the Party is hampered. But the bourgeoisie in San Francisco did not realize that our Party was also aware of this simple fact, that our Party had started to learn from the experience of the German Communist Party, and was prepared for such an attack. Because of the alertness of the Party, only few leading comrades of the District Committee were arrested during the terror and a few leading comrades from the sections. The picture would be entirely different if the comrades had not been trained for such a situation. The District, Section, and even Unit leadership would have been taken by the bourgeoisie, put in jail for a shorter or longer period, and in this way the work of the Party organizations would have been crippled.

In this regard there are two main lessons to be drawn from the experiences of San Francisco: 1. The proper safeguarding of the Party leadership; 2. The development of forces which immediately can take the place of comrades who fall into the hands of the enemy during struggles.

What are the problems we face in connection with the first question?

1. We know very well that the fascist terror in San Francisco, Seattle, Portland, Toledo, Minneapolis are not isolated cases, but a definite trend towards fascism in the United States. We know very well that in the present situation we need honest, sincere, steeled, leading comrades who will not break down under any circumstances. But are we sure that our leading forces are composed of such elements? Have we systematically examined our comrades in the District,

Section and Unit leadership? Have we examined their past? Have we watched their role and their behavior in different situations? If we consider the rapid development of fascism, the intense preparations for imperialist war, we dare not forget for one moment that the effective work among the masses will depend not only upon the reliability and stability of our leading forces, but also upon our having broad cadres and many reserve forces. The Center, the District and Section Committee should immediately start to examine every individual leading comrade in the organization. We have to know everything about our leaders,—about our staff from top to bottom,—their social background, their personal connections, their ability in doing certain phases of work. We must be sure that if we put a comrade in a certain position, he will fulfill the tasks and will not waver or break down under any circumstances. If we neglect to examine thoroughly our leading cadres, systematically, in time,—if we don't make this a permanent task, we will pay very dearly in the coming period. There is no time to lose! Every day, every hour counts.

Safeguarding our Party Apparatus

We have to safeguard our leading forces and the Party apparatus. It is understood that the leading comrades should be in the forefront of every struggle of the masses. If they fail to do this, they will not have the confidence of the masses, but, at the same time, we must find ways and means to protect these comrades from being arrested in a situation similar to San Francisco. Every comrade must have prepared already today a place where he or she can stay in case of any emergency; the home of a sympathizer who is not known by the police should be secured in advance so that when the terror breaks, the comrades can disappear from their home. We will not always know when the bourgeoisie will attack us; therefore we must be prepared at all times. We have to keep in mind that the bourgeoisie has an efficient apparatus in following up the leading forces of our Party and the Party apparatus also. They know quite well where prominent comrades live. The fact that the home address of a leading comrade is not known by other members of the organization is not a security against the police.

The most important problem in connection with the question of cadres is the development of new forces and at the same time the training of all our forces to do the work independently. Today in most of our Districts, there is yet a very unhealthy situation in regard to this question. There are many excellent exceptions, but we cannot say yet that the majority of the lower organizations of the Party have already independent life. The activities of the sections and

especially of the units are directed by the higher committees through instructions. In the event of an emergency situation, similar to San Francisco, when it will be very difficult to send these instructions down to the lower organizations, if there are no developed comrades in the sections and units who on their own initiative continue to work, the organizations will cease to function or will not function with full strength and ability. In San Francisco, for example, approximately half of the units issued leaflets on the situation in their own neighborhood, mobilizing the population for sympathy to the general strike. These units did not wait for any instructions. The comrades in these units and sections realized that the Party does not cease to function if instructions do not come from above. They realized that the unit is the Party in the shop and in the neighborhood, and they have to continue their work under any circumstances. We have to develop our forces today to use the greatest initiative in their work and not to wait for org. letters, to apply the general line and policy of the Party to the problems of the shops and territories. If we fail to make our cadres in the lower organizations realize the importance of this orientation, we will lose connection with the masses in situations where the fascist terror is unloosed against us. And that is the object of the bourgeoisie.

Developing New Forces

Another problem which we have discussed so many times in our resolutions and articles is the question of developing new forces. In Germany, thousands and thousands of leading functionaries were arrested, killed or sent to the concentration camps, but, when one leading comrade was arrested, there was another one to take his place. There was a systematic conscientious policy in the Party to develop new forces by the thousands. The question of continuous follow-up of every promising member of the party in the unit, in the section, individual attention to these comrades, schooling, promotion of forces from the lower committees to the higher committees, selection of promising comrades who are leaders in strikes, unemployed struggles, will help us to a great extent to solve this problem. There is yet a weakness in many of our Districts which must be overcome as rapidly as possible, and that is the failure to develop and bring forward to the leadership American elements. The new cadres must be developed mainly in the actual and concrete Party work, but this must be supplemented by the necessary training. Our new cadres will be developed on the basis of carrying on work among the masses, and through a maximum increase of the political activities of the Party by which the ideological level will be raised. How can we talk about de-

veloping new forces in the units when we find that in many units of our Party, in some of the concentration Districts, the Resolution of the Eighth Convention which was held in April, had not yet been discussed in July? How can the comrades in the units carry on independent work independently when they do not understand the general line of the Party?

One of the main sources for the training of new forces is the proper development of collective leadership in the Party organization. In the election before the Party convention, hundreds of new forces were elected to the Party committees in the sections and districts. But they have not been sufficiently drawn into the work, developed and trained. Many new comrades are coming forward in the fractions of the unions and mass organizations. Do we see to it that these comrades get political training? The basic weakness of our Party in many places is that one or two old comrades, in reality, do all the work. Nothing is easier than to build around one old experienced comrade a committee composed of new promising forces and distribute various functions among them. The result will be that the work will be really carried out and, in addition, these old comrades will be able to perform their real job of leadership and, which is most important, scores of young active comrades will be trained in the work and developed. The best forces, the best leaders, will come from the factory nuclei where the comrades are in constant touch with the masses, know their reactions on every issue, and will properly reflect the mood of the masses in the leadership. We have to concentrate on these nuclei, select the comrades there and develop them further in the Party. We know that we will have tremendous struggles in the coming period.

The possibilities of giving leadership to the fighting toilers are greater than ever before. The general attack of the bourgeoisie on the living standards of the workers (rising prices, wage cuts, speed-up) against the civil rights of the masses, the development of fascism, the war danger, increase the tasks of the Communist Party. We need more and more forces to carry on the work. Thousands of Communist leaders are needed to agitate, propagandize, organize the workers in the shops, unions, on the street, the starving farmers on the countryside. We need forces to work among the toilers in uniform.

In the coming struggles we will have many victims. Many of our leaders in the units, sections and districts will have to be shifted from one place to another in order to avoid persecution. We will have to replace these comrades. Our reserve forces must be built up now. There is no time for delay! Events are moving rapidly!

Experiences of Shop Nuclei

In order that there may be an interchange of experiences of shop nuclei the Organization Commission has sent questionnaires to each district for reporting on the activities, growth and experiences of all the shop nuclei in the district. We have also asked each district to send us the outstanding experiences of the shop nuclei. These shall be printed from time to time in the **Party Organizer** and in the Party Life Column of the **Daily Worker**. Two of these reports follow. We urge every district to follow this example and send the experiences of the shop nuclei to the National Office of the Party.

Shop Nuclei in Steel Mills in District 6

In M——, the units played an important role against the company unions. We issued leaflets, exposed the company unions in the shop paper, and carried on a general agitational campaign in the mill. We held a mass meeting in the Park which exposed the role of the company union and the lay-off. The results were good as far as the company union is concerned. In the June elections the vote for the company representatives was very small.

We have a small functioning opposition group in the A. A. which is carrying on a fight against the lay-offs in the mill, following the general policy as outlined in the shop paper, i. e., demanding that relief committees be elected, that all the needy members be registered, and that a fight be carried to the county and city relief organizations demanding immediate relief for them; this struggle to involve all union members, the unorganized and the unemployed, generally. At the same time, to organize a struggle against the Republic Steel Corp. demanding that a minimum of \$5.00 weekly be paid by the company to every laid-off steel worker.

In C——, not much has been done since the steel strike sell-out. Only general agitation in the mill, exposing the company union in the shop paper, and whatever we can do through the opposition group that we have in the A. F. of L. B, the opposition leader in the Federal Local in the Berger Division of the Republic Steel, has been elected delegate to the C. L. U. here and a central opposition group is being organized. We expect to get much better results in the immediate future.

Shop Nucleus in a Cigar Factory in Dist. No. 25, Builds Opposition Group in A. F. of L.

NUCLEUS F 1 was formed in the middle of May with three new Party members in the shop and one outside member. The main activity was to convince the workers of the correctness of the Party policy within the A. F. of L. unions. At that time not one belonged to the union. A shop committee of seven, including the Party members, was formed. By the end of the month, most of the workers in S. C. joined the Party. At one of the picnics of a sympathetic club, the correctness of the Party decision on joining the A. F. of L. was discussed, although, in the beginning, the nucleus members talked very "radically" against the A. F. of L.

The workers present, non-Party members, gave proof of the existing confidence of workers in the A. F. of L. Especially was the Independent Union policy criticized. Its wrong methods and past mistakes narrowed our influence. The workers of this shop now say that they do not join the unions because they have faith in the A. F. of L. leaders, but in order to organize strong oppositions inside the union.

At the first joint membership meeting of the A. F. of L. locals more than 300 workers were present. The shop nucleus mobilized all the forces at this meeting, and forced, together with others, the adoption of a program of demands that suit the cigar makers. The comrades however, failed to carry out a decision of the Rank and File Committee to present the demands. This is the immediate task, and, through the shop committee, it is being explained to the rest of the workers in the shop.

Because of the above activities, the unit has grown to seven and the shop committee to 12, including Party members. However, it failed to extend its influence to other departments in the shop. Our forces are the cigar makers only. They are the overwhelming majority in any cigar factory; in this one, over 100. The nucleus collects weekly nickels from workers in the shop for general Party activity, leaflets, etc.

Experiences With the "Midland Worker"

THE FIRST ISSUE of the *Midland Worker* came out last April, after a long silence of its predecessor, the *Hot Rivet*. It is issued by the Communists working in the Midland Steel Products Co., of Cleveland, Ohio. Three issues of 700 shop papers and one of 250 have been put out, with no more than a half a dozen workers turning them down. Better known as the "Midland Butcher Shop," the shop victimizes its workers, who say that they all must be stool-pigeons if they are to keep their jobs, to the worst degree, slashing wages, cutting down hours, demanding more work in less time out of machines ready for the scrap pile, and refusing to employ safety devices.

It is with these conditions in mind that the shop paper has carried on an exposure of the N.R.A., linking them up with Roosevelt's policy of "remembering the forgotten man" and the mass struggles of workers against the fascist forces of the government in Toledo, San Francisco and Minneapolis, and raising the revolutionary way out of the crisis as the only means for the workers to raise their standard of living and finally establish a government under which they will be able to live like human beings.

In April the Company issued two letters. The first explained to the workers that the N.R.A. did not demand the workers to organize and asked them to come into the office individually and talk things over. The second announced that business was poor and that the Company had to reduce its force very much. To these we answered with a challenge, but a poor one. A poor one because it was inadequate. We should have demanded that the Company show that the workers do not need to organize by restoring wages to the 1929 wage level, by paying for lost time, by paying cash relief each week that the workers are laid off until the Workers Unemployment Insurance Bill is passed, by paying a two-weeks' lay-off wage, by abolishing speed-up, by recognizing the Midland local of the S.M.W.I.U., and by endorsing H. R. 7598. In this way the exploitation by the Company would have stood out in bold lines.

In August the main issue in the plant was the fight against lay-offs. Our front page article raised the necessity of the passage of the Workers Unemployment Insurance Bill, calling upon the workers to organize committees in every department to demand that the bosses pay cash relief in

the meantime. Likewise, in an editor's note to a letter asking whether the Company should pay the workers' carfare or not when it asks them to report and then sends them home, we called upon the workers to organize grievance committees to demand carfare from the bosses. Another article interpreted the strike wave, drawing the conclusion that "the Roosevelt program of remembering the forgotten man is a hunger program, keeping the working class chained to the interests of the bosses, denying it every right that labor could use for its protection and reaching into its midst to find fakers to betray it", and bringing out the lessons forged in battle—namely, "1. The rank and file must be in control"; "2. Strike committees must be elected by the workers"; "3. Police terror must be answered with solidarity"; "4. Fakers must be exposed and thrown from our ranks." Against this background of treachery and betrayal we bring the results of building Socialism in the Soviet Union, where the workers own and operate the factories, mines and mills.

By interpreting the mass struggles of workers and the actions of the bosses and their allies, by drawing the inevitable conclusions and showing the concrete organizational way out, we try to rally the greatest number of workers around our Party in the shop. The results may be seen in groups of workers discussing the shop paper during lunch hour and after working hours. They may be seen in the correspondence from the shop. For example, a letter asking the I.L.D. to take up a case of inhuman speed-up immediately. Here, of course, was required an editor's note explaining the function of the I.L.D. and bringing forward the S.M.W.I.U. and the Party.

But the shop paper has more organizational influence on the workers than our comrades in the nucleus. Their meetings are irregular and little real work is being done in the shop. Not for one moment must we forget that the shop paper is an instrument for our Party in the shop. A shop paper is only as good as the nucleus which publishes it. Our first Bolshevik determination must be to make a real fighting nucleus in the Midland Steel. So far no organization has made any considerable headway in it.
